Syllabus

Title
2587 Computational Game Theory
Instructors
Mag. Mathias Staudigl, PhD
Type
PI
Weekly hours
2
Language of instruction
Englisch
Registration
10/01/26 to 10/27/26
Registration via LPIS
Notes to the course
Dates
Day Date Time Room
Wednesday 12/09/26 09:00 AM - 12:00 PM LC.5.056
Thursday 12/10/26 10:00 AM - 12:00 PM TC.3.11
Wednesday 12/16/26 10:00 AM - 12:00 PM LC.5.056
Thursday 12/17/26 10:00 AM - 12:00 PM D4.0.136
Friday 12/18/26 10:00 AM - 12:00 PM TC.3.07
Monday 12/21/26 10:00 AM - 12:00 PM TC.3.08
Monday 01/11/27 10:00 AM - 12:00 PM TC.3.08
Wednesday 01/13/27 10:00 AM - 12:00 PM LC.2.076 Kurslabor
Tuesday 01/19/27 10:00 AM - 12:00 PM TC.3.06
Wednesday 01/20/27 10:00 AM - 12:00 PM TC.3.06
Monday 01/25/27 09:00 AM - 12:00 PM TC.3.06
Contents

Non-cooperative game theory is a branch of game theory for the resolution of
conflicts among players (agents), each behaving selfishly to optimize one’s own well-
being subject to resource limitations and potentially other restrictions coming from
rival’s actions. While being a standard modelling technique in economics, the Nash paradigm recently received further attention in connection with adversarial machine learning and multi-agent reinforcment learning, as well as challenging problems in distributed optimal control. The quest for efficient numerical algorithms and the analysis of their complexity thus became an important question in the modern theory of computational game theory. In this course we will introduce the basic tools of these modern techniques. 

 

Dates    Topic     Time
9.12.2026 Introduction to Normal form games 9:00-12:00
10.12.2026 LP Formulation for Zero-Sum games 10:00-12:00
16.12.2026 Elements of Mathematical Programming 10:00-12:00
17.12.2026 Potential and congestion games. 10:00-12:00
18.12.2026 Finite-Dimensional Variational Inequalities 10:00-12:00
21.12.2027 Online learning and regret minimization in games. 10:00-12:00
11.01.2027 Online learning and regret minimization in games. 10:00-12:00
13.01.2027 Learning dynamics and equilibrium selection 10:00-12:00
19.01.2027 Markov decision processes 10:00-12:00
20.01.2027 Stochastic games and multi-agent reinforcement learning 10:00-12:00
25.01.2027 Stochastic games and multi-agent reinforcement learning 9:00-12:00

Learning outcomes

After completing this course, students will know how to model multi-agent and strategic optimization problems in large-scale settings. They will be aware of computational approaches to Nash equilibrium, as well as learning approaches. Modern applications, like multi-agent reinforcement learning will be discussed as well.

Attendance requirements

Attendance is mandatory (80 % of the classes).

Teaching/learning method(s)

The course is a combination of lectures and tutorial style classes.

Assessment

In order to successfully pass the course, the following assessement criteria need to be satisfied:

  •  Handing in take home assignments (20 points)
  • Presentation (20  points) 
  • Oral exam (60 points) 

In total students can reach 100 points.

The grading of the course follows the scheme below:

Genügend (4) ≥ 50 , Befriedigend (3) ≥ 60, Gut (2) ≥ 70, Sehr gut (1) ≥ 80.

Readings

Please log in with your WU account to use all functionalities of read!t. For off-campus access to our licensed electronic resources, remember to activate your VPN connection connection. In case you encounter any technical problems or have questions regarding read!t, please feel free to contact the library at readinglists@wu.ac.at.

Other

Recommended Literature:

  • Maschler, Michael, Shmuel Zamir, and Eilon Solan. Game theory. Cambridge University Press, 2020.
  • A Modern Introduction to Online Learning by Francesco Orabona
  • Facchinei, F., Kanzow, C. (2010). Generalized Nash equilibrium problems. Annals of Operations Research, 175(1), 177-211.
  • Cesa-Bianchi, N., Lugosi, G. (2006). Prediction, learning, and games (Vol. 1, No. 1.1). Cambridge: Cambridge university press.
  • Albrecht, S. V., Christianos, F., Schäfer, L. (2024). Multi-agent reinforcement learning: Foundations and modern approaches. MIT Press.
Last edited: 2026-08-18



Back