Syllabus

Title
4147 Philosophy of Science
Instructors
ao.Univ.Prof. Dr. Gabriele Mras
Contact details
gabriele.mras@wu.ac.at
Type
PI SE
Weekly hours
2
Language of instruction
Englisch
Registration
02/10/17 to 03/03/17
Registration via LPIS
Notes to the course
Subject(s) Doctoral/PhD Programs
Philosophy of Science
Methodology and Theory
Dates
Day Date Time Room
Wednesday 03/08/17 04:00 PM - 06:30 PM TC.3.07
Wednesday 03/15/17 03:00 PM - 06:30 PM TC.3.07
Wednesday 03/22/17 03:00 PM - 06:30 PM TC.3.07
Wednesday 03/29/17 03:00 PM - 06:30 PM TC.3.07
Wednesday 04/05/17 03:00 PM - 06:30 PM TC.3.07
Wednesday 05/03/17 03:00 PM - 06:30 PM TC.3.07
Saturday 05/20/17 10:00 AM - 12:30 PM Ort nach Ankündigung

On this page:

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Contents

Some perennial problems concerning the possibility of justifying scientific claims will be presented; the explication of the concept of Causality will be discussed. We will consequently begin with David Hume's Sceptical Doubts concerning the Operations of the Understanding. Next, we will move on to John Stuart Mill’s distinction between necessary and sufficient conditions. The final part of this course will be devoted to the idea of a Logical Reduction defended by Logical Empiricism, the so called Problem of the Empirical Basis, Karl Popper's idea of Falsifiability as a demarcation line between science and pseudo-science and David Lewis' account of Counterfactuals. If there is enough time we will beginn to discuss the Concept of Possible Worlds. 

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Learning outcomes
Participants of this course are supposed to get familiar with the nature of scientific knowledge; i.e. what is to be acquired is knowledge about what distinguishes scientific claims from (mere) opinions, metaphysical statements or assertions of faith.
At the end of this course one ought to be able to analyse and evaluate the most influential approaches of the philosophy of science and the ways in which the following questions have been pursued:
  1. What is the potential support of a scientific claim?
  2. What are the ways in which scientific claims could be used in order to formulate predictions?
  3. In which way does the formulation of a hypothesis depend on (1) and (2)? 
It is essential for following this course to understand and appreciate the dilemmas involved in pursuing scientific questions.
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Teaching/learning method(s)

Lecture, text analysis, discussion; this course will be based on philosophical texts. The reading material will be made available in on Learn@WU. Students are highly encouraged to participate actively in class. Please also bring the material we discuss with you.

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Assessment

Requirements and Assessment:

  1. A set of questions will be distributed every time in class; the questions are based on the argument structure of the class: 20%
  2. Class participation in general: 30%
  3. Final exam: 50% (3 May 2017)
The exam will consist in a list of around 10 questions chosen out of the collection of questions distributed in class to be answered openly.
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Prerequisites for participation and waiting lists
Some knowledge in philosophy would be helpful, but is not required.
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Availability of lecturer(s)

Lecturer: ao. Univ. Prof. Dr. phil. Gabriele Mras
Office hours: Thursday 14:00–15:00,
Building D4, 3rd floor, room number D4.3.020
Phone: 01-31336-4257
Email: gabriele.mras@wu.ac.at

Tutor: Patrick Lerch
Email: patrick.lerch@wu.ac.at

Administration: Bettina Gerdenich
Phone: 01-31336-4166
Email: bettina.gerdenich@wu.ac.at

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Other
If there are any questions regarding administration, feel free to ask Mr. Patrick Lerch (patrick.lerch@wu.ac.at).
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Unit details
Unit Date Contents
1 08.03.2017/16:00–18:30

Intro to class, administrative details, course overview;

The questions we will pursue are:
"What is science?", "What is it the aim of a philosophy of science?", "What is knowledge?", "How could something to be shown to be knowledge?"
2 15.03.2017/15:00–18:30

A) ARGUMENT, PROOF, VALIDITY

"What is an argument?", "What is meant by "deduction"?", "What are examples of fallacies?"

Readings:

  • Aristotle: The Beginnings of Logic. In: Copi & Gould (eds.): Readings on Logic; New York: MacMillan 1972, p. 8-16.
  • Geach, P. T.: Hypotheticals. In: Reason and Argument; Berkeley and Los Angeles: Blackwell 1976; Chapter 18, p. 89-91.
  • The Writing Center at UNC Chapel Hill: Fallacies; Available at http://writingcenter.unc.edu/handouts/fallacies/.

B) THE CIRCLE OF INDUCTION

  1. David Hume's analysis of inductive reasoning.
  2. Inductive vs. deductive reasoning, the problem of induction, the "principle of uniformity".
  3. Discussion: Is empirical knowledge justified by inductive reasoning? lf not, what prospects are left for justifying empirical statements? 

Readings:
3 22.03.2017/15:00–18:30 C) JOHN STUART MILL, CAUSAL RELATIONS, NECESSARY AND SUFFICIENT CONDITIONS, QUESTIONS OF APPLICATION

  1. Causal dependencies and the idea of necessity.
  2. Mill’s distinction between necessary and sufficient conditions.
  3. Questions of Application: Causality and Economics

Readings:
4 29.03.2017/15:00–18:30

D) LOGICAL EMPIRICISM AND THE CONDITIONS OF THE POSSIBILITY TO SHOW THAT A THEORY HAS AN EMPIRICAL CONTENT

1. The idea of confirmation vs. the aim of proving a theory to be true.

  • The Vienna Circle' and the principle of verifiability. 
  • What is verifiability? What are singular consequences of hypothetical statements? What is meant by "reduction of general sentence to observational sentences"? 
  • What are the basic properties of observation sentences or "protocol sentences"?

2. Application of thoughts and ideas concerning the limits of empirical confirmation: Barry Stroud's Criticism.

Readings:

  • Carnap, R.: Logical Foundations of the Unity of Science In: Hanfling (ed.): Essential Readings in Logical Positivism; Oxford: Blackwell1981, p. 112-129.
  • Carnap, R.: Protocol Language In: The Unity of Science; London: Routledge 1934, p. 42-52.
  • Carnap, R.: Causality. In: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Science. New York: Dover 1995 [originally published in 1966], p. 187-215.
  • Stroud, B.: Causation. In: Engagement and Metaphysical Dissatisfaction. Modality and Value. Oxford, New York: Oxford Univ. Press 2011, p. 20-58.
5 05.04.2017/15:00–18:30

E) THE PRINCIPLE OF FALSIFIABILITY

1. Karl Popper's principle of falsifiability.

  • Falsifiability in contrast to verifiability.
  • What is the problem of the "demarcation principle" as suggested by the "Vienna Circle"? 
  • What is the modus tollens? 

2. David Lewis' account of counterfactuals.

  • What are 'basic sentences'?
  • The distinction between justified, true, verified, falsified, verifiable, falsifiable, corroborated scientific statements.

Readings:

  • Popper, K.: [Extracts from] The Logic of Scientific Discovery: London and New York: Routledge 2004, p. 3-26, p. 27-34, p. 54-56, p. 66-67, p. 76-82, p. 82-85, p. 88-94, p. 264-273, p. 273-275.
  • Chalmers, A. F.: Introducing falsificationism: In: What is this thing called Science?; Maidenhead 1982, p. 55-68.
  • Lewis, D.: Comparisons. In: Counterfactuals. Malden, Oxford and Victoria: Blackwell 1973, p. 65-83.
  • Lewis, D.: Foundations. In: Counterfactuals. Malden, Oxford and Victoria: Blackwell 1973, p. 84-95.
6 03.05.2017/15:00–18:30 Final Exam (2,5 hours)
7 20.05.2017/10:00-12:30

Workshop "Philosophy of Science"

Conference "Force, Content and the Unity of the Proposition"

LC.0.004 Galerie

tba
Last edited: 2017-03-02



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