Syllabus

Title
0843 Game Theory
Instructors
Dr. Monika Köppl-Turyna
Contact details
E-Mail: monika.koeppl-turyna@agenda-austria.at; Tel: +43 1 361996120
Type
PI
Weekly hours
2
Language of instruction
Englisch
Registration
11/27/17 to 12/01/17
Registration via LPIS
Notes to the course
Subject(s) Master Programs
Dates
Day Date Time Room
Monday 12/04/17 09:00 AM - 11:00 AM TC.3.10
Wednesday 12/06/17 09:00 AM - 11:00 AM TC.3.07
Monday 12/11/17 09:00 AM - 11:00 AM TC.3.10
Wednesday 12/13/17 09:00 AM - 11:00 AM TC.3.07
Monday 12/18/17 09:00 AM - 01:00 PM TC.5.04
Wednesday 12/20/17 09:00 AM - 11:30 AM TC.4.04
Monday 01/15/18 09:00 AM - 11:00 AM TC.3.10
Wednesday 01/17/18 09:00 AM - 11:00 AM TC.3.07
Monday 01/22/18 09:00 AM - 11:00 AM TC.3.10
Wednesday 01/24/18 09:00 AM - 11:00 AM TC.3.07
Contents

1. Static games of complete information: normal form games; IESDS; Nash equilibrium in pure and mixed strategies; existence of Nash equilibrium


2. Applications of static games: Cournot model of duopoly; Bertrand model of duopoly; the problem of the commons


3. Dynamic games of complete and perfect information: backwards induction; Stackelberg model of duopoly; sequential bargaining

4. Dynamic games of complete but imperfect information: subgame perfection; finitely repeated games; infinitely repeated games and folk theorem;


5. Bayesian games: Bayesian Nash equilibrium; incentive compatibility; the revelation principle

Learning outcomes
By the end of the semester students will:
1. understand the subject and applications of static and dynamic games.
2. be able to solve game-theoretical problems using conceptual, analytical and graphical methods.
3. be able to formulate economic problems in a form of a game.
4. be able to apply their knowledge to real-life economic phenomena.
Teaching/learning method(s)
The course will be mainly held in a form of a lecture, using PDF-slides (which will be made available for the students to download). Additionally, there will be two to three problem-solving sessions and homeworks, which will be evaluated as part of the activity grade.
Assessment
1. A midterm exam - 30%
2. A final exam at the end of the semester - 50%
3. Activity in class incl. homeworks - 20%

Readings
1 Author: Robert Gibbons
Title: A Primer in Game Theory

Publisher: Princeton University Press
Year: 1992
Content relevant for class examination: Yes
Recommendation: Strongly recommended (but no absolute necessity for purchase)
Type: Book
2 Author: Drew Fudenberg, Jean Tirole
Title: Game Theory

Publisher: MIT Press
Year: 1991
Content relevant for class examination: No
Recommendation: Reference literature
Type: Book
3 Author: Martin J. Osborne, Ariel Rubinstein
Title: A Course in Game Theory

Publisher: MIT Press
Year: 1994
Content relevant for class examination: No
Recommendation: Reference literature
Type: Book
4 Author: Andreu Mas-Colell et al.
Title: Microeconomic Theory

Publisher: Oxford University Press
Year: 1995
Content relevant for class examination: No
Recommendation: Reference literature
Type: Book
Recommended previous knowledge and skills
Knowledge of intermediate microeconomic theory, calculus (optimization), basic probability theory
Availability of lecturer(s)
Office hours: per appointment; Email: monika.koeppl-turyna@agenda-austria.at; Tel: +43 1 361996120; Homepage: http://www.annaboleyn.net
Last edited: 2017-05-09



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