1. Static games of complete information: normal form games; IESDS; Nash equilibrium in pure and mixed strategies; existence of Nash equilibrium

2. Applications of static games: Cournot model of duopoly; Bertrand model of duopoly; the problem of the commons

3. Dynamic games of complete and perfect information: backwards induction; Stackelberg model of duopoly; sequential bargaining

4. Dynamic games of complete but imperfect information: subgame perfection; finitely repeated games; infinitely repeated games and folk theorem

5. Bayesian games: Bayesian Nash equilibrium; incentive compatibility; the revelation principle

By the end of the semester students will:

1. understand the subject and applications of static and dynamic games.

2. be able to solve game-theoretical problems using conceptual, analytical and graphical methods.

3. be able to formulate economic problems in a form of a game.

4. be able to apply their knowledge to real-life economic phenomena.

The attendance requirement is met, if a student is present at least 80%. Therefore, students are allowed to be absent for up to two classes.

The course will be mainly held in a form of a lecture, using PDF-slides (which will be made available for the students to download). Additionally, there will be two to three problem-solving sessions and homeworks, which will be evaluated as part of the activity grade.

1. A midterm exam - 30%

2. A final exam at the end of the semester - 50%

3. Activity in class incl. homeworks - 20%

Knowledge of intermediate microeconomic theory, calculus (optimization), basic probability theory

Email: monika.koeppl-turyna@agenda-austria.at; Tel: +43 1 361996120; Homepage: http://www.annaboleyn.net